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WINNING BY FINANCIAL ATTRITION: A STUDY OF ATTORNEY
FEES UNDER CALIFORNIA FAMILY CODE
SECTIONS 2030 AND 2032"
Jan Maiden"
INTRODUCTION
"It is a fact of life that attorneys representing clients in family law cases
frequently do not receive payment of fidl and adequate compensation for
the services they perform."'
Paula Ruisi has been involved in a long, drawn-out and contentious cus-
tody battle with Kip Thieriot, the father of her son.: Kip is extremely
wealthy, but the actual amount of his assets is unknown, as he "stipulated
that he has the ability to pay any and all attorney fees incurred by Paula."'
On the other hand, "Paula is a single, self-employed mother, with virtually
no assets and only a very modest income."
Paula had primary physical custody of the couple's minor child, and in
1993 she filed a motion to relocate with the child to Rhode Island.' The court
denied the motion because it determined Paula had not proved the move was
necessary under existing law. The court also granted Kip joint physical cus-
tody." Paula appealed, and while that appeal was pending, the law regarding
move-away cases changed with the California Supreme Court's decision in
The author wishes to thank Professor Janet Bowermaster for suggesting this topic, as
well as for her permission to use the phrase "Winning by Financial Attrition" from her amicus
letter to the California Supreme Court regarding Ruisi v. Thieriot.
. J.D. Candidate December 2001, California Western School of Law. M.S.W., San
Diego State University, 1978. B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1975. This Com-
ment was inspired by my experiences working for both Janice Pohl. C.F.L.S. and Robert
Wood, C.F.L.S. In several cases, after the trial court failed to award adequate attorney fees,
both of these attorneys continued to represent the clients, knowing that the client would never
be able to pay their fees.
1. In re Marriage of Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (Cal. App. 1985).
2. Appellant's Petition for Review at 5, Ruisi v. Thieriot, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 4121 (Cal.
2000) (No. A084897) (en banc), rev. denied [hereinafter Appellant's Petition in Ruisil.
3. Id
4. Id.
5. Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 768 (Cal. App. 1997).
6. 1d.
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In re Marriage of Burgess.' As a result, the appellate court reversed and re-
manded the matter for a trial de novoY
From 1993 to 1995, Paula had to represent herself in propria persona,
whereas from 1995 through 1997, she could afford only limited counsel.'
Her first attorney withdrew when the trial court repeatedly "deferred her re-
quests for interim fee awards."'" The trial court eventually awarded $15,000
to Paula to retain an attorney at trial." Later, when Paula again requested
fees to pay her first attorney the fees and costs still owed, as well as to pay
her second attorney, the trial judge did not grant the full amount, claiming
that to do so would be "unfair and unreasonable."' 2 This was in spite of
Kip's stipulation "that the fees sought were reasonable and that he had the
ability to pay them in full." 3 Paula's second attorney then withdrew, and
Paula's two requests that year (1996) for fees to retain counsel were denied."
Paula encountered great difficulty in finding representation, as most at-
torneys were not willing to take her case because she did not have the finan-
cial resources to pay their fees and because the court refused to award ade-
quate attorney fees. 5 Finally, Paula found a firm willing to represent her if
the trial court would award her advances for attorney fees, which the court
did in the amount requested of $20,000.6 One year later, the firm determined
that the case was more complex than it had originally anticipated and that
fees would be greater than expected. 7 "Sixty two percent (62%) of the un-
planned and unestimated charges ... was incurred in response to motions
and actions taken by Kip."'" Therefore, Paula filed another motion for an in-
terim fee award, detailing the 614 hours expended by her counsel and the
762 hours expended by Kip's counsel.'9 Again, "despite Paula's complete
lack of resources and Kip's stipulated ability to pay, the trial court awarded
her only $44,963.34 in fees and costs out of the total of $115,663.42 re-
quested." '20 This amount was only thirty-nine percent of the actual fees and
costs incurred by Paula's attorneys, or a payment the equivalent of only $65
7. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Burgess changed the standard for deciding whether a parcnt
with custody of a child could relocate. The moving parent does not have the burden to prove
that the move is "necessary." Id. at 479.
8. Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 (Cal. App. 1997).
9. Appellant's Petition in Ruisi, supra note 2, at 6.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8-9.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
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per hour.2 ' In comparison, Kip paid his attorneys $167,000, an average
hourly rate of $219 per hour.2
The trial judge awarded Paula these inadequate attorney fees only three
months prior to trial--too late for Paula's attorneys to resign, even though
they could not afford to continue to represent her.' The attorneys recog-
nized, however, that no other attorney would take the case, given the judge's
history of fee awards.' Paula's former counsel filed a declaration on behalf
of her current firm's attempt to receive additional attorney fees for trial, not-
ing:
In my opinion, Ms. Ruisi would not be able to find competent counsel to
represent her subsequent to this order. The standard used by Judge Mellon
as well as the way he applied this standard, would discourage any attorney
with common sense from entering the case given Ms. Ruisi's lack of eco-
nomic resources and Mr. Theriot's [sic] vast economic resources. In dis-
cussing with [current counsel] his desire to withdraw for financial reasons,
I informed him of this opinion.7"
When Paula appealed the attorney fee award, the Court of Appeal held
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in his award of a "reasonable fee,"
even though "the amount was clearly inadequate to compensate Paula's
counsel for their effort at prevailing hourly rates." 26
When the court awarded Paula attorney fees, it engaged in fee shifting:
"shifting the costs of the action to the adverse party."" Fee shifting is an ex-
ception to the general American Rule that each party to a lawsuit is respon-
sible for its own fees.' At common law, a husband was responsible for all of
his wife's expenses, including legal fees, because he had control of the mari-
tal assets.29 Today, when laws must be gender-neutral, the rationale is to
"level the playing field"' by placing the spouses on an "equal footing"." All
21. 1d
22. L. at 12.
23. Ld.
24. Id.
25. Id at 13.
26. Il
27. Stewart Douglas Hendrix, "Better You 77zan Me:" Shifting Attorney's Fees in Di-
vorce Actions, 34 U. LoUISvm.LE J. FAM. L. 671 (1995-96).
28. Gaetano Ferro, Attorney's Fees in Dissolution of Marriage Cases-Is it Time For a
Change? 7 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw 1, 4 (1991); Hendrix, supra note 27, at 672; Edward
M. Ginsburg, Fee Shifting: How One Judge Views the Process. 22 FAN 1. ADVOC. 29 (1994).
29. Hendrix, supra note 27, at 672. This rule, referred to as the "suit-money rule," "re-
quired the husband to provide [law]suit money to ensure the wife was able to litigate ade-
quately her claim." Id.
30. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 29.
31. Daniel F. Sullivan, Amount of Allowance for Attorney's Fees in Domestic Relations
Action, in 45 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 699, 706 (Supp. 2000).
3
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fifty states in the United States now allow fee shifting awards, either by stat-
ute or case law.32
Although California law allows fee shifting in marital dissolution mat-
ters,33 when the courts do not adequately compensate attorneys, the economi-
cally disadvantaged spouse is unable to afford legal representation. Califor-
nia Family Code Section 2032 provides criteria for judges to use in
determining whether to award attorney fees in marital dissolutions." In prac-
tice, however, judges have discretion is considering these factors when
granting fees. There are significant practice implications when the award is
less than the fees incurred, as attorneys are unable to continue to represent
their clients. As this pattern repeats, attorneys then become less and less
willing to represent clients with limited means.36 In turn, many women
choose to settle out of court rather than face the risk of "inconsistent and un-
predictable" awards.37
Part I of this Comment discusses the award of attorney fees in marital
dissolutions, including public policy; the governing statutes and statutory
history; and the basis for awards: the judge's discretion, and the factors to be
considered. Part II examines the limitations of the current laws and their ju-
dicial interpretation, including gender bias by the courts, which results in the
lack of adequate representation for the economically weaker spouse when
the court fails to award attorneys adequate compensation; how need has be-
come a conclusory concept affecting fee awards; and the problem with the
appellate court's "abuse of discretion" standard of review for a trial court's
fee awards. Part III discusses alternatives to the current system of fee
awards. The Comment concludes by examining the consequences of the cur-
rent provisions for fee awards in dissolution proceedings.
I. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
An analysis of the award of attorneys fees in dissolution proceedings re-
quires an examination of the underlying public policy supporting the fee
shifting; the statutes and the statutory history of the provisions; and the role
of judicial discretion, as well as the factors considered in making a fee
award.
32. Hendrix, supra note 27, at 671.
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030 (West 2000).
34. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032 (West 2000).
35. See In Re Marriage of Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 792 (Cal. App. 1985).
36. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in Family Courts, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 22, 26
(1994).
37. id. at 26 (discussing awards for spousal support and the high costs of legal represen-
tation).
[Vol. 38
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A. Public Policy
California's public policy is to encourage finality in marital dissolutions
by "providing at the outset of litigation, consistent with the financial circum-
stances of the parties, a parity between spouses in their ability to obtain ef-
fective legal representation."" This policy recognizes the financial and emo-
tional costs of divorce proceedings." In addition, the policy ensures that the
economically disadvantaged spouse has both adequate finances to pursue the
matter and access to the courts: "primary cornerstones to the concept of fun-
damental fairness under the law." Moreover, under California public pol-
icy, a spouse without sufficient funds should not be prevented from litigating
when the other spouse is able to pay."'
While the general rule in civil cases is to award fees and costs to the
prevailing party in civil suits,12 the attorney fee award in domestic relations
matters is not to "reward" "3 the party who may ultimately prevail. In fact,
fees may even "be awarded against a prevailing party." For example, the
court affirmed an award of attorney fees to a wife that was based on need,
even though the husband had been successful in his motion to reduce spousal
support."
B. Statutes
In addition to public policy rationales, statutes and their respective his-
tories further enable one to understand the award of attorney fees in dissolu-
tion proceedings. Specifically, Sections 2030 and 2032 of the California
Family Code govern the award of attorney fees during marital dissolution
proceedings. Section 2030(a) states:
38. Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 790. See also In re Marriage of Kelso, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39,
45 (CaL. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Mulhern, 106 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (Cal. App. 1973);
Crook v. Crook, 7 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895 (Cal. App. 1960); In re Marriage of Aninger, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 388, 396 (Cal. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Cal. 1984);
In re Marriage of Ward, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 368 (Cal. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Auf-
muth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 680 (Cal. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Janssen. 121 Cal. Rptr.
701, 703 (Cal. App. 1975); In re Marriage of Green, 261 Cal. Rptr. 294, 301 (Cal. App.
1989); In re Marriage of Barnert, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616, 625 (Cal. App. 1978); In re Marriage of
Braud, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 197 (Cal. App. 1996).
39. Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
40. Ward, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 368 (Cal. App. 1992) (citing In re Marriage of Swink, 807
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Colo. App. 1991)).
41. In re Marriage of Pollard, 158 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (Cal. App. 1979).
42. 33 CAL. JuR. 3d Family Law § 1270 (1994).
43. Perry v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (Cal. App. 1970).
44. In re Marriage of Hublou, 282 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal. App. 1991) (citing WuILAM
P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA PRAcrcE GUIDE: FAM1ILY LAw 14:13
(1991)).
45. Id.
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[T]he court may, upon (1) determining an ability to pay and (2) considera-
tion of the respective incomes and needs of the parties in order to ensure
that each party has access to legal representation to preserve all of the
party's rights, order any party, except a governmental entity, to pay the
amount reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of main-
taining or defending the proceeding.4
Furthermore, Section 2032 states:
(a) The court may make an award of attorney's fees and costs under Sec-
tion 2030... where the making of the award, and the amount of the
award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the re-
spective parties.
(b) In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circum-
stances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to
enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial re-
sources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to
the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in
Section 4320.4' The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney's
fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party's
own attorney's fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other
party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources
are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to appor-
tion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under
their relative circumstances. 8
Prior to 1985, the court's discretion to award attorney fees to the party
in need was "limited by the principle that a wife may not be required to im-
pair the capital (as opposed to income) of her separate estate in order to de-
fray litigation expenses.""' This was seen as a "relic of the era" when the
husband had management and control of the community property." The law,
then Civil Code § 4370.5,"' was first revised in 1985, by adding subdivision
(c), which provided that, "The court may order payment of the award from
any type of property, whether community or separate, principal or income,"2
thus overruling prior cases. 3
46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030(a) (West 2000).
47. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 2000) (requiring the court to consider the enumerated
circumstances in determining the amount due for spousal support).
48. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032(a), (b) (West 2000).
49. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO
LITIGATION EXPENSES IN FAMILY LAW PROCEEDINGS, 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 355
(1986) [hereinafter CAL. L. REVISION].
50. Id.
51. This section later became California Family Code Section 2032. In re Marriage of
O'Connor, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 481 (Cal. App. 1997).
52. In re Marriage of Aninger, 269 Cal. Rptr. 388, 397 (Cal. App. 1997).
53. Id. (citing CAL. L. REVISION, supra note 49, at 357 (referring to In re Marriage of
Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244 (1972) and In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591
(1977))).
[Vol. 38
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The courts began to interpret the new law in such a way as to severely
disadvantage the spouse who was "in need" of an award of fees. In one case,
the court held: "While it may seem unfair in the face of husband's vast
wealth to require wife to exhaust her liquid assets to pay her attorney's fees,"
the wife did have her own funds and failed to prove need.5' Another case
held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's
fees when she had sufficient liquid assets to pay the fees herself."
In 1990, the same year that both cases were decided, the Legislature
once again amended the attorney fee awards statute. It added the word "rela-
tive" to subdivision (a) so that it read, "just and reasonable under the relative
circumstances of the respective parties."S6 The legislature also amended sub-
division (b) at the same time by adding:
The fact that the party requesting an award of attorneys' fees and costs has
the resources from which he or she could pay his or her own attorneys'
fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part, or
all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor
for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost
of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circum-
stances.57
The factors in the statute, however, are not intended to be exhaustive:
"[t]he court may consider any other proper factors, including the likelihood
of collection, tax considerations, and other factors announced in the cases.""
In 1994, California Civil Code Section 4370.5 was incorporated into the
California Family Code as Section 2032, without significant changes. '
C. Judicial Discretion and the Factors Considered in Fee Awards
The trial court judge has the discretion to determine an award of attor-
ney's fees.' "Discretion must be exercised in a manner which is not capri-
cious or arbitrary, but, rather, is impartial and guided by fixed legal princi-
ples."61
In exercising its discretion, the trial court is required to consider the
statutory factors set forth in California Family Code Sections 2030 and
54. In re Marriage of Joseph, 266 Cal. Rptr. 548, 555 (Cal. App. 1990).
55. Aninger, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
56. O'Connor, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482 (emphasis added).
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032 (West 2000).
59. O'Connor, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481.
60. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Cal. 1984); In re Marriage of Sea-
man, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 695 (Cal. App. 1991); In re Marriage of Rosan. 101 Cal. Rptr. 295.
305 (Cal. App. 1972); In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921 (Cal. App. 1978);
Line v. Line, 171 P.2d 733, 736 (Cal. 1946).
61. In re Marriage of Kerry, 158 Cal. App. 3d 456, 464 (1984) (citing Carroll v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 892, 898 (Cal. 1982)).
7
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2032: there must be a need for the award and the obligor must have an abil-
62ity to pay.
Courts have taken a variety of approaches in determining need. For ex-
ample, the trial court judge in one case stated:
I never grant attorney fees around here, or virtually never, basically, be-
cause one of the main factors in determining attorney fees is the property
that is awarded to the parties. And that is a factor which cannot be deter-
mined until the ultimate divorce.., in the family law area an attorney or-
dinarily carries the client until the time of trial, if the lawyer has reason to
suppose that he will be ultimately paid, you see, if there is property...
No, I'm not going to rule on attorney fees. I can tell you that right now. 3
In that case, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion when it denied attorney's fees for the wife's attorney, when the wife
had no income and could not pay fees or costs.6' The appellate court noted
that by denying the wife an award of attorney fees, when she had no income
and received only $500 per month for child and spousal support, the trial
court put her "in the position of being unable to retain counsel or, in all
probability, of retaining either inexperienced or incompetent counsel to rep-
resent her."'6 The appellate court also stated that in determining the wife's
need, the trial court should not have considered the child and spousal support
payments she received as available income to pay her attorney fees.'
Another appellate court found an abuse of discretion when a trial court
made a "need-based" award to wife's attorney of only $500, when actual
fees and costs were $9,281.50.67 The appellate court found that where the
wife had minimal assets and her only income was child support, while the
husband had a large income and substantial assets, "[t]here was no apparent
reason for the trial court's decision to award fees so grossly disproportionate
to those actually charged to the client.""8 Similarly, in another case where the
wife "had more than $1,100 in monthly expenses and no way of supporting
herself' the appellate court held that she "made a prima facie showing of
need" and remanded the matter to the trial court to award her attorney fees
for prosecuting the appeal.'
62. Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (citing In re Marriage of Popenhager, 160 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385 (Cal. App. 1979)); Kerry, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 665; Hunter v. Hunter, 20 Cal. Rptr. 730.
734-35 (Cal. App. 1962); Pollard v. Pollard, 158 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (Cal. App. 1979); In re
Marriage of Braud, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 197 (Cal. App. 1996); Sullivan, 691 P.2d at 1024;
Perry v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (Cal. App. 1970).
63. Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id. at 793.
66. Id. (noting that an exception could be found if there were sufficient funds after the
payment of living expenses to pay attorney fees).
67. Braud, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
68. Id. at 198.
69. In re Marriage of Melone, 238 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (Cal. App. 1987).
[Vol. 38
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The trial court may find "need" by one of the spouses even though the
spouse has adequate resources to pay attorney fees and costs, because the
court considers the "relative circumstances" of the parties." For example, in
a case in which the husband was originally awarded $250,000 in attorney
fees, and then received an additional $450,000, the wife appealed, arguing
that the husband had no need." The parties had incurred over $3 million in
attorney fees and the husband still had $2 million in assets while the wife
had at least $40 million.' The court rejected the wife's argument, based on
the "unequivocal" language of the statute:" "[W]e find nothing ... which
would suggest that the Legislature intended to endorse any fixed measure of
percentage as a way to demonstrate need or the lack thereof... [it] could not
be more clear in eschewing any notion that a numerical standard should be
applied. 7
4
In addition to requiring proof of "need," the statute also requires the
court to determine whether the spouse against whom the fee award may be
made has the ability to pay the other spouse's requested attorney fees. In one
case, the trial court found that the husband's "half-million dollar yearly in-
come and seemingly extravagant expenditures permitted an inference that he
could afford $6,220 for [the wife's] fees and costs."" In another case, the
appellate court found that, "Despite [the husband's] claim of poverty" he
was able to pay attorney fees, because he had liquid assets--property that
was listed for sale at $900,000 and several horses."' 6 Even where need is es-
tablished, if the other spouse does not have the ability to pay, "it is an abuse
of discretion for a court to impose such an obligation upon one of the desti-
tute parties which will hang as a sword over the obligor .. ""
In addition to the statutory factors set forth in Section 2032, judges must
also consider additional factors that have been set forth in case law" includ-
ing:
[T]he nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill
required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention
given, the success of the attorney's efforts, his learning, his age, and his
experience in the particular type of work demanded.. .; the intricacies and
70. See O'Connor, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482-83.
71. Id. at 481.
72. d at 481-82.
73. Id. at 484.
74. Id
75. In re Marriage of Janssen, 121 Cal. Rptr. 701. 703 (Cal. App. 1975).
76. In reMarriage of Melone, 238 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (Cal. App. 1987).
77. In re Marriage of Pollard, 158 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851-52 (Cal. App. 1979). The court
also noted that, "[o]n inquiry, private counsel expressed his hopes that his services would not
be of the pro bono nature despite the size of the dispute." Id. at 852 n.2.
78. In re Marriage of Braud, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 198 n.30 (Cal. App. 1996).
9
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importance of the litigation, the labor and the necessity for skilled legal
training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed.79
The "difficulty" of the litigation is often interpreted by the court as
meaning one party's lack of cooperation in the proceedings. Sometimes this
occurs when one party fails to accurately disclose information. In one case,
the husband's income was initially presented as $50,000, but the wife's at-
torneys "developed statistics and so forth and had to pull it all out," and as-
certained that his income exceeded $115,00."° The court held: "In light of the
difficulty [the wife] and her attorneys encountered in determining [the hus-
band's] actual income and their success in establishing its size, the award of
attorneys' fees was well within the trial court's discretion."'" In another case,
in which there was "conflicting evidence regarding whether husband had
'stonewalled' [the wife] and been difficult during discovery," the court
found no abuse of discretion in an attorney fees award of $80,000 to the
wife.82
In a case in which the appellate court upheld an award of $750,000 in
future attorney fees to the wife, where the wife had only requested $500,00,
the court found that it was "a case of stunning complexity, occasioned, for
the most part, by husband's intransigence."83 The appellate court noted that
when the wife originally filed for a divorce in Colorado, the husband evaded
service for twenty-six months.8" The wife's attorney also had to travel to the
Isle of Jersey when husband filed a divorce action there, which the husband
later withdrew.85 After the wife finally filed for dissolution in California,
where jurisdiction could be obtained, the husband continued to engage in
acts that resulted in the wife incurring additional attorney fees, such as when
the husband's attorney scheduled the wife's attorney's deposition but never
appeared to take the deposition.86
In determining whether to award attorney fees, the courts have also con-
sidered the attorney's skill and expertise, which includes additional factors
79. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921-22 (Cal. App. 1978) (quoting Berry
v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 460 (Cal. App. 1946)).
80. In re Marriage of Wright, 131 Cal. Rptr. 870, 872 (Cal. App. 1976) (quoting the trial
court).
81. Id.
82. In re Marriage of Kozen, 230 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (Cal. App. 1986). The husband ap-
pealed the trial court's fee award, arguing that "the evidence did not show wife needed the
money or that he had the ability to pay, and... the amount of fees and costs were unreason-
able." Id. The appellate court rejected husband's arguments but never addressed need and
ability to pay, only whether the amount of wife's fees were unreasonable. Id. The court
seemed to focus more of the factor of "difficulty"-the husband's lack of cooperation
throughout the proceedings. Id.
83. In re Marriage of Dick, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 756 (Cal. App. 1993).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
[Vol. 38
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such as "the responsibility undertaken"" and "whether counsel's skill and
effort were wisely devoted to the expeditious disposition of the case."' In
addition, one court held that there is not necessarily a direct relationship be-
tween the "reasonable value of an attorney's services" and the amount of
time billed, noting, "One hour spent in negotiation might be more valuable
than 10 hours spent in trial.""
An appellate court found that an award of $1,500 by a trial court was
not an abuse of discretion because the amount was all that was "reasonably
necessary" pursuant to the statute. " The request for attorney fees had been
for $5,000, where the attorney had spent approximately 118 office hours,
two half-days in court appearances and two and one-half days at trial.9
The trial court in another case awarded only $5,000 of the $15,345 in at-
torneys fees requested by wife's attorney, finding "the amount of time in-
vested by wife's counsel was unreasonable and unnecessary." The appellate
court stated:
Certainly a desirable objective of domestic litigation is prompt and equita-
ble resolution of marital difficulties rather than their bitter prolongation.
Conscientious and successful efforts by counsel to resolve as many areas
of disagreement as possible without judicial intervention is entitled to se-
rious consideration in awarding attorney's fees. Comensable professional
legal skill is not limited to trial time or courtroom techniques alone."'
Finally, the court must award fees that are "reasonably necessary" to
maintain or defend the action.' One appellate court affirmed the lower
court's denial to award a substantial portion of the attorney fees requested by
the wife's attorney because the trial court found the attorney fees were un-
reasonable and unnecessary." The trial court judge stated:
Attorneys' fees in this case, to establish a support order for a healthy lady,
after [a] three-and-a-half-year marriage, are outrageous, in my judgment,
for both sides.... The expenses for five professionals to evaluate every-
body, to opine, to depose, to do what they did and testify here, is only as a
consequence of the fact that Mr. Huntington has money.... I find this to
be totally unreasonable in light of the length of the marriage and in light of
the circumstances of the parties, what they had when they started the mar-
riage and when they ended the marriage.... This case, presented, should
have cost no-more than $10,000 for attorney's fees on each side, and
maybe [$]5,000 or [$]6,000 in professional fees.... But I sense that it has
87. In re Marriage of Munguia, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (Cal. App. 1983) (citing Patten
v. Pepper Hotel Co., 96 P. 296, 302 (Cal. 1908)).
88. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 71 (Cal. App. 1974).
89. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926 (Cal. App. 1978).
90. In re Marriage of Rosan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 305 (Cal. App. 1972).
91. Id.
92. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 70 (Cal. App. 1974).
93. Id at 71.
94. CAL. FA.. CODE § 2030 (West 2000).
95. In re Marriage of Huntington, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1. 7-8 (Cal. App. 1992).
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cost a great deal more, and the Declaration of [appellant's counsel] indi-
cates that he believes he's worth $60,000 on this case, and I do not. I be-
lieve this case is a $10,000 attorney's fees case.... And if you gentlemen
had checked my record from Orange County, which is a relatively affluent
county, you would have found that I pay substantial attorney's fees for
substantial and important work, and I pay little, if any, attorney's fees for
inconsequential[,] inappropriate and unjustified work.... Therefore, on
attorney's fees and costs, each party shall bear their own fees and costs.
This case should never have been here.96
A final consideration in determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion is the trial court judge's knowledge and skills. "[T]he rule is that
when the trial court is informed of the extent and nature of the services ren-
dered, it may rely on its own experience and knowledge in determining their
reasonable value." For example, where the parties stipulated to a judge,
who was the former supervising judge of the Family Law Department of the
Los Angeles Superior Court, the appellate court upheld the award, finding
that the trial judge was "particularly qualified to make a rational assessment"
of the future attorney fees requested.98
A trial court's failure to consider the statutory factors for attorneys fee
awards is an abuse of discretion. For instance, an appellate court held that
the trial court abused its discretion when it "refused to consider the factors
required by law, the respective incomes and needs of the parties" when the
trial court stated that it did not make pendente lite awards of attorney fees."
In another case, the trial court made an award of $25,000, based "on nothing
more that wife's secondhand comment (albeit in a declaration) about what
her latest 'bill' stated, and on wife's counsel's unsworn representation that
she was owed 'approximately $35,000."" ' In that case, the appellate court
held that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the
factors to be used in determining an award and did not inquire as to the rea-
sonableness of the fees.'0 '
"Domestic relations litigation, one of the most important and sensitive
tasks a judge faces, too often is given the low-man-on-the-totem-pole treat-
ment.' '""e Therefore, while the trial court "may rely on its own experience and
knowledge" in deciding a fee award," 3 not all family law judges have the
96. Id. (quoting trial court judge).
97. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. App. 1978). See also Frank v.
Frank, 28 Cal. Rptr. 687, 689 (Cal. App. 1963) (citations omitted).
98. In re Marriage of Dick, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 756 (Cal. App. 1993).
99. In re Marriage of Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 793 (Cal. App. 1985).
100. In re Marriage of Keech, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 531 (Cal. App. 1999).
101. Id. at 531-32.
102. In re Marriage of Brantner, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (Cal. App. 1977). See Schafran.
supra note 36, at 22 (noting that "some believe that 'real law' is commerce and crime whereas
family law is a second-class assignment or punishment").
103. Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 924; Frank, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (noting that while there
was no specific evidence, the trial court judge "had sufficient evidence to determine what
would constitute a reasonable fee under the circumstances").
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requisite knowledge and experience about the practice of family law.' This
in turn affects the trial judge's ability to assess the value of the hours spent
by counsel as productive or unproductive as a basis for the award of attor-
neys fees." 5
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
"Attorney fee statutes often turn out to be a blanket that never quite covers
the bed, leaving a considerable number of clients and attorneys shivering
in the cold. W6
In addition to judicial discretion, there are other factors that affect the
award of attorney fees. Gender bias plays a major role in family law deci-
sions as to how, when, and to whom attorney fee awards are made. Another
factor is the concept of "need" and how it is interpreted by the courts. Fi-
nally, the current system of judicial review fails to correct abuses of trial
court discretion in awarding fees.
A. Gender Bias Results in a Lack ofAdequate Representation for Clients and
a Lack of Adequate Compensation for Attorneys
"Family law matters are breeding grounds for bias."'4" Every judge
brings his or her own deeply personal opinions about families and divorce to
the bench, based on his or her experiences.' The gender bias in family law
has been extensively documented." Justice Rosalie Wahl, chair of the Min-
nesota gender bias task force stated: "[T]he judicial system into which... all
women come--seeking justice as parties in dissolution .... in personal in-
jury... in domestic abuse... discriminates---on the same basis and to the
same degree as every other of our major societal institutions because of
104. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMITTE- ON GENDaR BIAS is TlE
COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THc CAUF-ORNIA COURTS:
FINAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMITrEE- ON GiNDER
BIAS IN THE COURTS 160 (1996) [hereinafter GENDER BIAs]. "The family law judge is often
the newest judge on the court and usually has little or no experience in family law." Id. Coal-
pare with In re Marriage of Ward, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 371 (Cal. App. 1992) (noting that the
trial judge was "a former experienced family law practitioner").
105. See Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 926 (discussing the relationship between the reason-
able value of legal representation and the productive and unproductive hours worked on a
case).
106. Reba Graham Rasor, The Contingent Fee and Domestic Law. 7 J. AMt. ACAD.
MATRmA. LAW 43, 44-45 (1991).
107. GENDER BIAs, supra note 104, at 119.
108. Schafran, supra note 36, at 22; GENDER BIAS, supra note 104, at 120.
109. Schafran, supra note 36, at 22 (discussing how twenty-one states' task forces have
issued reports on gender bias and its affect on women).
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shared beliefs about the inferiority or difference of women. This... is 'Insti-
tutional Sexism'....,,1o
As women generally have fewer financial resources, they often lack suf-
ficient funds to retain counsel."' Moreover, working mothers earn less as a
result of pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare responsibilities. "' The spouse
"[1lacking economic parity and access to liquid funds... may either have to
retain inexperienced or incompetent counsel; find counsel or a lender willing
to extend unlimited, unsecured credit; or appear in propria persona.""'
Moreover, even though California Family Code Sections 2030 and 2032
provide for an award of attorney's fees when "just and reasonable," the stat-
utes do not guarantee that the spouse in need receives sufficient funds to en-
sure adequate representation."' Thus, the inability of low-income spouses,
primarily female spouses with children, to obtain adequate legal counsel
suggests systemic gender bias." 5 A study of gender bias in the California
family law courts found:
Inequities in the award of attorney's fees present serious obstacles to ob-
taining representation. These inequities include the denial of fees when
they should be awarded according to case law and the granting of differen-
tial awards between male and female attorneys.
These barriers to access to the courts have their most serious impact on the
poor and on the primary caretakers of children, who are most often women
in the context of the family law court."16
In a case that lasted nine and one-half years, the trial court made an
award of only $1,500 in attorney fees when $11,855 was requested."' The
same attorney represented the wife for the duration of the case, which in-
cluded "fifteen pretrial court appearances, ten sets of written discovery, mo-
tions, briefs, preparation for seven aborted trial dates ... and [an] appeal." 8
The wife's attorney testified that the wife had paid him $150 during those
nine and one-half years, but that he had not billed her "because she could not
110. Id. at 23 (citing Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Rosalie E. Wahl, "'ltF. TASK
FORCE ON GENDER BIAS LN THE COURTS: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR CIIANGw, Second
National Conference on Gender Bias in the Courts 6-7 (1993)).
111. Schafran, supra note 36, at 26.
112. See generally VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988).
113. Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, 812 P.2d 931, 939 (Cal. 1991).
114. Id. at 940 n. 11 (noting that the lower court awarded the wife only about twenty-five
percent of the attorney fees she incurred).
115. Letter from Janet M. Bowermaster, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law, Letter Brief Arnica Curiae In Support of Petition for Review, to The Honorable Ronald
George, Chief Justice, and the Associate Justices, California Supreme Court (May 4, 2000)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Bowermaster Arnica Curiae Letterl.
116. GENDER BIAS, supra note 104, at 188.
117. In re Marriage of Fransen, 190 Cal. Rptr. 885, 888 (Cal. App. 1983).
118. Id. at 889.
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afford to pay anything."19 The appellate court, in ordering a retrial, stated
that, "No attorney should be paid a fee inconsistent with the work he has
performed.' 20
Attorneys who represent low-income women find that although public
policy favors providing financial parity between the parties, the reality is that
the objective is often ignored by the courts.' An attorney with the San
Diego Volunteer Lawyer program, Kate Yavenditti, said,
I think that those of us who represent low income women come into court
with a mark against us.... I mean, I've made comments to judges about
it, ... you know, I know what you're going to do to me because you know
who I represent and they laugh it off. But it's not a laughing matter, it's an
absolute reality. We come into court and we don't get attorney's fee or-
ders,.., or [we get] lower attorney's fee orders, or ... the attorney's fees
will be deferred.f
An attorney from Fresno further noted:
I think there is a real problem when you have a woman who is forced on to
welfare as a result of the family breakup, and the attorney goes into court
and asks for attorney's fees, and it is postponed, deferred, postponed, de-
ferred, and here is a poor woman who is trying to get representation to
fight the bread-winner of the family who has all the money and she is pen-
niless. And I will tell you that as an attorney, it is very difficult to repre-
sent these people when there is no money in the offing. r'
An attorney is not likely to represent the economically disadvantaged
spouse when the court fails to award adequate compensation, even though
the purpose of the law is not to adequately compensate the attorney. "[Ilt
must be remembered that attorney's fees are granted to the wife for her bene-
fit rather than that of her attorney."' Therefore, when retained by a client
without financial assets, the attorney has to make choices in how to represent
the client, knowing that there may not be an adequate fee award." Another
alternative is to withdraw from the case when the court fails to make an ade-
quate award."6 What the courts seemingly often fail to consider however, is
that, as stated by Justice King, "Banks and finance companies are licensed
for the purpose of lending money; lawyers are not."' 2'
119. Id.
120. Md
121. GENDER BIAs, supra note 104, at 193.
122. ld. (alteration in quoted source) (citing San Diego public hearing trascnpt. 142-43).
123. GENDER BIAs, supra note 104, at 193-94 (citation omitted).
124. In re Marriage of Gonzales, 124 Cal. Rptr. 278. 280 (Cal. App. 1975) (citation
omitted).
125. Telephone interview with Richard M. Bryan, Senior Partner, Bryan. Hinshaw &
Barnet (Mar. 23, 2001) (attorney for Paula Ruisi in Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Cal.
App. 1997)) [hereinafter Bryan InterviewI.
126. Il
127. In re Marriage of Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (Cal. App. 1985)
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Women attorneys may also encounter bias. One attorney reported that
when she and male attorneys requested attorney's fees, the judge told her,
"You don't need as much as he does."'' 8 Thus, a female attorney representing
a financially disadvantaged spouse may be even less likely to receive an
adequate fee award.
B. Need as a Basis for Fee Awards
A wife in a dissolution action must "beg [the court], piecemeal, for a
few dollars, which she must prove is 'needed' to prosecute her action or de-
fense ........ .29 In awarding attorney fees, the statutes require that the court
consider the "respective incomes and needs of the parties."'' 0 While the stat-
ute includes objective criteria for determining income, it provides no such
criteria for determining need. Indeed, need is a conclusory concept.' In the
context of alimony,
[e]ven the definition of 'need' ... is hopelessly confused. Is the wife 'in
need' only when she is unable to support herself at a subsistence level? A
moderate middle class level? The level to which she was accustomed in
the marriage, no matter how high? The courts have used all of these ap-
proaches. Without an articulated theory, we cannot argue that any of these
definitions is correct. 1
Similarly, there is no definition of need as a basis for attorney awards.
The only assistance the statute provides is that the court may find that a party
with his or her own resources is still in "need" of attorneys fees.' Therefore,
it becomes a matter of the judges' discretion to determine if need exists,
whether the party in need has no assets and no means, or has substantial
wealth. This may provide the courts with flexibility, but it provides clients
and their counsel with no consistency or predictability. An attorney may
work assiduously to zealously represent his or her client, only to have the
court find that the client's "need" does not justify a fee award commensurate
with the fees and costs incurred.
Finally, although the court has total discretion to award fees to the
spouse in need to "level the playing field," the result is that the field is not
always leveled. Rather, it may slope, for as noted in many of the above
cases, the fee award is not always sufficient to pay the actual attorney fees
and the spouse in need may not have adequate assets to pay the balance. Fur-
128. GENDER BIAS, supra note 104, at 194 (citation omitted).
129. Schafran, supra note 36, at 26 (citing NEVADA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS TASK
FORCE, JUSTICE FOR WOMEN 17-18 (1989)) (alteration in quoted source).
130. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030 (West 2000).
131. IRA MARK ELLMAN, ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 388 (3d ed.
1998) (discussing the concept of the need in the context of alimony awards).
132. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1989).
133. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032 (West 2000).
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thermore, the spouse in need is frequently the one with greater fees because
she or he must conduct extensive discovery to determine community assets
and other relevant information. In addition, one spouse may use the court
system to "punish" the other spouse, in "a deliberate attempt to exhaust her
[or him] financially and emotionally and deny her [or him] effective coun-
sel."" This problem has been described as where:
[T]he "economically advantaged spouse" uses his or her greater control of
income or assets as a litigation tool, particularly in terms of making it ex-
tremely difficult for the "disadvantaged spouse" to retain appropriate
counsel or to otherwise adequately participate in litigation. The problems
in this area appear to be common and do not appear to be unique to upper-
income litigants; instead.., the problems exist all too frequently when-
ever there is significant inequality in terms of access to financial resources
during the pendency of a case.'35
On the other hand, the obligor spouse's attorneys fees are not reviewed
by the court as part of the process of determining a fee award. What often
results is that the attorneys receiving the fee award are paid only a percent-
age of their fees while the attorneys representing the obligor are paid in full.
C. Judicial Review of the Trial Court's Discretion
As long as the standard for the appellate courts' review of the trial
courts' discretion is an "abuse of discretion" there will be inadequate awards
of attorney fees. 36 The test used by the appellate court is that "discretion is
abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the
134. See In re Marriage of Green, 261 Cal. Rptr. 294, 302 n.9 (Cal. App. 1989). The
husband, a lawyer who represented himself, appealed the court's holdings regarding the date
for valuation of his law practice, the denial of his claims for reimbursement, the division of
community property, the award of sole physical custody to his wife without ordering addi-
tional mediation, the denial of his request for a new trial, and the award of attorney fees to his
wife. Id at 295-96. Justice King wrote in the decision "ItIhere is an old adage that a lawyer
who represents himself has a fool for a client. Whether that adage applies to [the husband].
who has primarily acted as his own attorney at trial and on appeal, we leave to the reader to
decide." ld- at 296. The appellate court stated further that the husband "consistently attempted
to frustrate the policy of [California Family Code Section] 4370.5 [now Cal. Farn. Code Sec.
2032] to promote settlement of litigation, reduce costs, and encourage cooperation between
the parties." Id at 302.
135. The Domestic Relations Subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association Circuit
Court Liaison Committee, A General Explanation of the "Leveling of the Playing Field" In
Divorce Litigation Amendments, 11 C.B.A. REc. 32 (1997) (citing the Domestic Rclations
Subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association Circuit Court Liaison Committee Second In-
terim Report 3 (1996)).
136. See Letter from Michael Willemsen, Senior Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, to the
California Supreme Court (Apr. 8, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Willemsen
Amicus Letter]. Mr. Willemsen was the appellate attorney for Paula Ruist for her unsuccess-
ful appeal of the first child custody order and for a writ of mandate seeking removal of the
trial judge. Id.
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bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.""' In
marital dissolution cases, a motion for attorney fees "is left open to the
sound discretion of the trial court; in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal."''
Trial courts refuse to award the entire amount of the fees requested,
based on vague standards such as "unreasonableness" and "over-
litigation."'39 Moreover, the appellate court may not revise the trial court's
judgment in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion,' even if the appellate
court thinks it would have decided the matter differently "had the matter
been submitted to its judgment in the first instance.""' For example, one ap-
pellate court found no abuse of discretion with the trial court's award of only
one-third of the amount of fees requested, stating that, "A reviewing court is
not authorized to revise the lower court's judgment even if it should be of
the opinion that it would have made a different award had the matter been
submitted to its judgment in the first instance."'4 2 Moreover, the court stated
that "we are constrained... by the application of an 'abuse of discretion
standard' and thus [the affirmance of the trial court's award] should not be
taken ... as tacit approval of adequacy .... ,,13
III. ALTERNATIVES
There are several alternative approaches to the current system of award-
ing attorney fees. The California courts, however, have rejected fee awards
that are based on anything other than the required factors. Nevertheless,
some modifications of the system would allow for more equitable awards re-
sulting in increased representation for economically disadvantaged spouses.
An award based on the other party's fees is not allowed. For example,
the court held that where the trial court "require[d] [the] husband to pay at
least as much for [the] wife's attorney fees as he did for his own" it failed to
consider the appropriate factors."'
Attorney fee awards in marital dissolution cases may not be based on a
percentage of the community property, in contrast to probate cases, in which
the attorney fees are based on a percentage of the estate.'" One court held
that an attorney fee award was not excessive when "the total fee allowed [the
137. Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 453, 456 (Cal. App. 1946) (citing Makzoume v.
Makzoume, 123 P.2d 72, 73 (Cal. App. 1942)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Howard v. Howard, 275 P.2d 93, 95 (Cal. App. 1954) (citing Wilder v. Wilder, 7
P.2d 1032, 1033 (Cal. 1932)).
141. Wilder, 7 P.2d at 1033.
142. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 70-71 (Cal. App. 1974) (citing Smith v.
Smith, 82 Cal. Rptr. 282, 286 (Cal. App. 1969)).
143. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
144. In re Marriage of Keech, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 531-32 (Cal. App. 1999).
145. CAL. PROB. CODE § 10810 (West 2000).
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wife] ... is only three per cent of the total community property of the par-
ties.""' A later case disagreed, holding "[T]here is no rule of law in this state
that an attorney's fee in a dissolution action is reasonable if it does not ex-
ceed three percent of the value of the community property estate irrespective
of the nature and extent of the services conducted.""' The court acknowl-
edged that while the value of the community estate may be relevant to dem-
onstrate "an ability to pay... the complexity and difficulty of the case and
skill and effort required of the attorney," an award must be based on the req-
uisite factors. " Furthermore, the issue in many family law cases, such as
Paula Ruisi's, is custody and visitation, and thus the value of community
property would not be a relevant basis for an attorneys fee award.
One suggestion to improve the current system is to ensure that "[t]he
same standards and [the] same level of scrutiny should apply to [each
spouse's] fees. Only then will the statutory goal of equal access to the courts,
and gender equality in the courts, be achieved.""' 9 This would address the
problem of the trial court judge deciding whether, in effect, one attorney
"earned" his or her fees, while totally disregarding the fees incurred by the
other attorney. Currently, the courts employ a double standard:
[The w]ife can be penalized if the court thinks she has been unreasonable
in her settlement position, has made excessive discovery demands, made
unnecessary motions, or, in general, 'over-litigated' the case, or spent time
that 'fails to contribute to a just resolution of the case.' [The h]usband
faces no such danger. His attorneys are free to go 'all-out', taking actions
which a judge might consider unnecessary but which are effective in ap-
plying pressure in a contested case; [the] wife cannot reply in kind.' m
One California attorney has devised a variation on the traditional fee-
shifting approach." At the outset of the case, he requests a fee award of ten-
tative fees." The attorney then takes his advances in increments, while sub-
mitting his bills to opposing counsel." If opposing counsel disapproves of
any line items, the matter then goes to court.' This allows the attorney to
obtain funds without constantly making requests of the court. In turn, the
court does not have to make a decision every time the attorney needs addi-
tional funds.
146. Lipka v. Lipka, 386 P.2d 671, 676 (Cal. 1963).
147. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 922 (Cal. App. 1978).
148. Id at 923. But see Ferro, supra note 28, at 21 (arguing that the traditional hourly
billing should be replaced by value-based billing and suggesting a starting of a percentage of
the gross assets).
149. Willemsen Amicus Letter, supra note 136.
150. Id.
151. Bryan Interview, supra note 125.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id
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Another alternative is to make a fundamental change in the method of
setting attorney fees. 5 While hourly billing is the most commonly accepted
means of determining fees, it has a number of limitations. "6 For example,
there is a conflict between the client's interest in resolving the matter as
quickly as possible and the attorney's interest in maximizing the number of
hours worked.'57 In addition, hourly billing does not reflect technological ad-
vances, such as computers and facsimile machines; it gives equal value to all
tasks; and it uses arbitrary units of time, e.g. one sixth of an hour."' There-
fore, value billing has been proposed as alternative that addresses the con-
flicting needs of client and attorney.'59 "Value billing encompasses the sub-
jective concept of a fee based on both the client's and the lawyer's
perception of value in a given matter at any given stage."'" This could in-
clude contingent fees, flat fees and result fees. 6 ' The proponents of this ap-
proach recognize that all the methods of billing have flaws, but that family
law attorneys should have the "opportunity to be creative in structuring fees
to meet the needs of their clients."'6 Because most of the suggested alterna-
tives address attorney-client issues, it is unlikely that such alternative meth-
ods of billing would have a major impact on the problems with fee awards
by the courts.
A fee award at the commencement of the case would encourage the par-
ties to settle quickly, and would thus result in lower fees:
The duration of a case would be drastically reduced if the nonmonied
spouse were compelled to pay opposing counsel's fees at the outset of the
action and at regular intervals. Forced to confront the unpleasant reality of
such an obligation, a party would be much less inclined to prolong the
litigation. 163
Moreover, because the dependent spouse lacks available funds at the
start of the proceedings, he or she may be unable even to retain counsel.'
6
'
Not every attorney is willing to take on a client and file all the pleadings and
go to court with a mere expectation of the court making a fee award.
155. See Linda J. Ravdin & Kelly J. Capps, Alternative Pricing of Legal Services in a
Domestic Relations Practice: Choices and Ethical Considerations, 33 FAM. L.Q. 387 (1999);
Barbara A. Stark, Value Billing-Matrimonial Attorney Fees in the 90's, 7 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRim. LAw. 79 (1991); Ferro, supra note 28.
156. Ravdin & Capps, supra note 155, at 388-91.
157. Id. at 389; Ferro, supra note 28, at 1-2.
158. Ravdin & Capps, supra note 155, at 89-90; Ferro, supra note 28, at 2.
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In contrast to the statutory fee-shifting in marital dissolutions, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has adopted an hourly rate fee system for appointed
criminal defense counsel, thus eliminating the trial court's discretion in fee
awards." Rather than relying on the court's weighing of the subjective fac-
tors, the attorney is paid at an hourly rate that is multiplied by the number of
"allowable hours.""' Attorneys may submit bills to the court every ninety
days." If system of payments were implemented in marital dissolution mat-
ters, it would reduce the unpredictability that family law attorneys face when
their fees are dependent on the court's discretion.
In a family law case in Florida, the State Supreme Court recently held,
"The lodestar, which is produced by multiplying the number of hours rea-
sonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, may be used as a starting
point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee."'' 3 While the respective fi-
nancial positions of the parties are a primary factor, the court must also con-
sider other relevant circumstances, "[S]uch as the scope and history of the
litigation; the duration of the litigation; the merits of the respective positions;
whether the litigation is brought or maintained primarily to harass ... ; and
the existence and course of prior or pending litigation.""'' The "lodestar"
method provides a more objective basis for fee awards, although the Florida
Supreme Court did note that trial judges have "wide leeway to work eq-
uity. 170
CONCLUSION
"Given the complexity of modern day family law litigation and the signifi-
cance of this litigation to our society, courts should be doing everything
they can to encourage, not discourage, able attorneys to handle family law
cases.
The current system of fee awards discourages attorneys from represent-
ing the financially disadvantaged spouse. The awards are often inadequate.
Consequently, the spouse without means, usually the woman, is unable to
retain counsel." When there is a large disparity between the spouses' in-
comes, such as between Paula Ruisi and Kip Thieriot, this results in the
165. California Supreme Court, Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Represent-
ing Indigent Criminal Appellants IIA ("Payment Guidelines") (revised Sept. 19, 1990, and
Dec. 22, 1993).
166. Id
167. Id
168. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1997).
169. Id. at 700.
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171. In re Marriage of Hatch, 215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (Cal. App. 1985).
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higher income spouse having a tactical advantage.' If the courts want to en-
courage attorneys to represent family law litigants with limited financial re-
sources, then they need to provide adequate fee awards.
The reasons for the inadequate awards include judicial discretion in
awarding fees, gender bias, an unclear definition of the concept of "need" as
a basis for a fee award, and the "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
Thus, it is clear that the failure of the courts to follow the factors set forth in
the law may result in spouses being unable to obtain and retain representa-
tion and attorneys being unable to carry the financial burden of representing
clients who do not have sufficient assets. Certainly, the fee awards to Paula
Ruisi were insufficient to allow her to obtain and maintain adequate repre-
sentation.
The current fee-shifting system is failing to serve its purpose of provid-
ing parity of legal representation between spouses in marital dissolution
cases. Although the law allows for fee awards, there is no certainty that they
will be made. Attorneys need to know that they will be paid for the work that
they have done and "that their good faith professional decisions about the is-
sues to be pursued and the time spent developing the case will not be readily
second guessed."'" Financially disadvantaged parties needs to know that
they are able to retain counsel to litigate their cases.
While judicial discretion is well established in our legal system and pro-
vides needed flexibility, it has also resulted in inadequate attorney fees and
thus, inadequate representation. Currently, there is too much flexibility,
without sufficient controls. If the "abuse of discretion" standard does not al-
low appellate courts to provide the necessary restraints on judicial discretion,
then perhaps it is time for the legislature to intervene. Among the options
would be to revise the "abuse of discretion" standard, provide weights to the
factors the trial court must consider, or revise the basis for fee awards to a
market rate.
Furthermore, the Judicial Council of California must continue its efforts
to address the ongoing problem of gender bias in the award of attorney fees
to women spouses and their female lawyers. This could include continuing
education, guidelines for judges, and monitoring and review of the fee
awards made.
Thus, to remedy the problem of inadequate attorneys fee awards,
changes must come from the legislature, from the court system, and from
practicing attorneys. But until the changes are made, the public policy, as set
forth in the statutes allowing fee-shifting, is in conflict with reality. The
playing field is not level and the party with the money will continue to win
by financial attrition.
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